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effect if it was clear that state officials would be willing to use it. But
any state-bankruptcy law that increased the state's restructuring
options would enhance the state's prebankruptcy leverage. Like
most laws, bankruptcy regulation casts a shadow.55
This shadow effect has an important and surprising implication:
it suggests that a bankruptcy law could prove beneficial even

if it

is

never used. In other contexts, disuse of a law is often cited as grounds
that the law is misguided or inappropriate.56 Perhaps based on this
intuition,

critics

of

Chapter

9,

the

closest

analogue

to

state

bankruptcy, sometimes point to its sparing use, and the fact that it
has rarely been invoked by a city of any size, as evidence that it is
ineffectuaJ.'? Although Chapter 9 may have other shortcomings,58 the
dearth of major cases is not by itself evidence that the legislation has
failed. Quite to the contrary, the shadow benefit may be enormous.
Indeed, if the bankruptcy framework enabled even a few states to
address debt overhang without actually going through a bankruptcy
process, we would have ample justification for a state-bankruptcy
law.
B.

Curbing Political Agency Costs
Nearly every state fiscal crisis can be traced, at least in part, to

the agency costs of political decision makers- that is, conflicts of
interest between the incentives of the decision makers and the
constituencies that they ostensibly represent.59 Most recently, two
related distortions have occupied much of the spotlight. The first is
lawmakers'

temptation

to

finance

current

expenditures

by

borrowing, which enables them to enjoy the benefits of spending

55

The "shadow" metaphor was coined in Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser,

Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950,997 (1979).
56

This intuition even has a name and doctrine: desuetude. See, for example, William J.

Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 591-94 (2001)
(describing desuetude and calling for its expanded use in criminal law).
57

See, for example, Orner Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in

Search of a Problem, 27 Yale J Reg 351, 359 (2010) ("The chapter is in fact seldom used, and it
has almost never been used by a large and important city.").
58

The most obvious is the phalanx of barriers that must be surmounted before Chapter 9

can be invoked. See, for example, Michael W. McConnell and Randal C. Picker, When Cities

Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U Chi L Rev 425, 455-61
(1993) (describing and criticizing entry requirements such as prebankruptcy negotiation with
creditors and demonstration of insolvency).
59

Agency cost terminology originated in the economic analysis of corporate governance

as an account of the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. See
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 303, 308-09 (1976).
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while shuffling the costs off to others.;;o The second arises from
lawmakers' dependence on the votes of the public employees whose
pensions they establish through ostensibly arm's length bargaining
with employee representatives.6' Although it would not eliminate
these distortions, a state-bankruptcy framework would curb both.
Start with lawmakers' temptation to fund current spending with
borrowed funds. The price of state bonds is buoyed-and thus the
cost of borrowing for the state is reduced-by an implicit promise
that bondholders will be bailed out if a state falls into financial
distress.62 By decreasing the cost of borrowing, this subsidy increases
the allure of credit, thus exacerbating the temptation to use bond
financing. By providing a mechanism for restructuring a state's bond
obligations in the event of a crisis, bankruptcy would trim this
subsidy. If bankruptcy reduced the pressure for a federal bailout, as
it likely would,6' it would assure that the price of bonds more
accurately

reflected

their

true

social

cost,

and

it

would give

bondholders an incentive to monitor the state's financial condition.
Lawmakers would still be tempted to borrow funds for current
spending, but they (and thus the state) would pay a higher price for
doing so.
The second distortion-states' pension obligations-is the single
greatest threat to states' fiscal stability. Many states have made
implausibly generous pension commitments to their employees, and
state

pension funds are

radically

underfunded-by roughly

$3

trillion, according to some recent estimates. 64 Political agency costs
are a prominent cause of the pension crisis. The lawmakers who
60
s'ee Gillette, 86 Denver U L Rev at 1256 (cited in note 29) (describing the "incentive
to utilize too much debt and to impose a temporal externality on future residents").
61
See, for example, Richard Epstein, The Wisconsin Shoot Out on Public Unions,

Defining

Ideas

(Hoover

Institution

Feb

22,

2011),

online

at

http://www.hoove r.org/publications!defining-ideasfarticle/67771 (visited Nov 25, 2011).
61
Th is is similar to the subsidy that bondholders of Citigroup and Bank of America

enjoyed in 2008, due to the widespread (correct, as it turned out) assumption the institutions
would be protected from default. See Dean Baker and Travis McArthur, The Value of the "Too
Big to Fail" Big Bank Subsidy, Issue Brief 2 (Center for Economic and Policy Research Sept

2009).
as

63
Oay Gillette has argued that the existence of a bankruptcy law could actually be used
a leverage by the state to secure a bailout. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism,

Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U Chi L Rev 281, 302-08 (2011)

(noting that contagion effects of state defaults would lead federal government to favor bailouts
over bankruptcy). Although Gillette's point about the strategic possibilities is an important
one, a state's ability to threaten to simply default already gives the state considerable leverage.
Bankruptcy seems likely to decrease pressure for a bailout overall, as discussed later in this
Article.

64
The high-end $3 trillion estimate comes from Robert Novy-Max and Joshua D. Rauh,
The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J Econ Persp 191, 204 (2009).

